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2019 marks 30 years since the Sommet de l’Arche in Paris established the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF) to combat money laundering. So where have we come to in Europe and 
what remains to be done? 
Money laundering has been criminalised not just in Europe but the world over. The term 
‘money laundering’, unheard of in 1989, is now in common parlance. However, the amount of 
proceeds of crime recovered as a result of successful money laundering prosecutions, as 
compared to the amount thought to be available to be laundered, is around 0.1% at best. So 
why is the European AML system so ineffective in reducing the impact of the underlying 
crimes upon European citizens? 
The major AML issues in Europe can be divided into three distinct areas: governance, risk 
management and capability. Some feel it is a simple question of reforming the European AML 
supervisory architecture, but the answer is much more complex and nuanced than that. 
Money laundering, like climate change and the threats to the natural world, is a truly 
European issue and needs a truly European response. 
CEPS intends to create a Task Force on how to achieve progress in the combat against money 
laundering at EU level. Interested parties are invited to contact the author, or CEPS direct. 
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Introduction 
Money laundering has been criminalised not just in Europe but the world over. Predicate 
offences (components of the more serious crime) have also been widened from drug 
trafficking to the proceeds of all crimes. Europol has established itself internationally in anti-
money laundering (AML) terms. The Egmont Group has grown to a large international 
organisation of 159 financial intelligence units, representing the operational arm of AML/CFT 
deterrence to complement the strategic arm of the FATF. Fifteen EU member states (plus the 
European Commission) are direct FATF members and the remaining thirteen are members of 
Moneyval, the European regional version of FATF. Moneyval includes non EU/EEA member 
states such as Russia and Ukraine. European governments evaluate each other’s AML 
performance every so often. The term ‘money laundering’, unheard of in 1989, is now in 
common parlance. However, the amount of proceeds of crime recovered as a result of 
successful money laundering prosecutions, as compared to the amount thought to be 
available to be laundered, is around 0.1% at best. It is small wonder that commission of the 
underlying predicate offences remains rife, and increasing, particularly in relation to emerging 
criminality, such as cybercrime. So why is the European AML system so ineffective in reducing 
the impact of the underlying crimes upon European citizens? 
The major AML issues in Europe can be divided into three distinct areas: governance, risk 
management and capability. Some feel it is a simple question of reforming the European AML 
supervisory architecture, but the answer is much more complex and nuanced than that. True, 
AML deterrence in Europe does need better governance, but improved structure of European 
authorities alone will not keep organised crime lords and other members of the dark 
economy awake unless it is allied to action, commitment and improvements in capability. 
Governance 
There are many fault lines across Europe in relation to AML governance: 
• There is no clear stated focus on what the objective of AML should be across Europe. 
Yet without clarity of vision, mission and modus operandi, it is difficult to see how 
progress can be achieved. It should be greater than merely securing the financial and 
operational integrity of the EU, though that would be a good start. The focus of most 
governments seems to have switched to fining the gatekeepers rather than convicting 
the perpetrators of the predicate offences. This is ineffective in terms of reducing the 
scourge of drug trafficking across Europe, for example; 
• Only 15 EU member states are members of FATF. The remaining 13 member states 
are members of Moneyval, a 28 state European FATF equivalent which includes 
members such as the Caucasus states, Russia and Ukraine. 19 of the 28 EU member 
states are members of the Eurozone. These fault lines all cause dislocation across the 
EU in terms of deterrence not just of money laundering, but of financial crime in 
general; 
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• There is no EU co-ordination body for AML policy except for the European 
Commission, certain monitoring and supervisory functions carried out by the 
European Central Bank and European Banking Authority, and certain loose 
information sharing arrangements between national authorities; 
• Laws relating to crime are reserved to individual member states. True, there is some 
co-ordination of investigation through Europol, and instruments such as the European 
Arrest Warrant have been created, but usage of such instruments varies wildly across 
the EU. 
Governance is not just about architecture, however, but also about ‘battle rhythm’: 
• The gestation periods of European legal and policy measures are far too long. In 
relation to MLD 4, for example, the ‘flash to bang’ time (carrying out policy 
development within FATF to implementation of the associated directive) was well over 
a decade. This is far too long in relation to deterrence of money laundering, a problem 
which will be exacerbated by the need to respond to the explosive growth of 
cybercrime; 
• The mutual inspection cycle is also around a decade long. With virtually all EU 
businesses subject to so much annual control and monitoring, why should this concept 
not apply in AML deterrence at governmental level? There is currently no annual 
assessment of EU member state performance against the FATF 40 Recommendations.  
Risk Management 
No Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) have been set by the FATF or Moneyval, and member 
states are not even collecting figures on the underlying offences in a co-ordinated manner, 
yet this is vital for effective policy development and the combat of money laundering and its 
predicate offences. How can policies possibly be effective if you don’t know the numbers? 
True, FATF has developed some indicators (known as “Immediate Outcomes”), but these are 
not the same as KPIs related to the predicate offences. An assessment of what really needs to 
be measured is urgently required, in order to develop the correct tools, fund the most 
effective action, and reduce the ever growing scourge of the underlying crimes. Even the 
most advanced EU member states are assessed as having a number of areas where major 
improvements are required, so greater government commitment is necessary. 
In order to reduce compliance burdens and increase effectiveness, the concept of risk based 
deterrence has been introduced. Although highly attractive conceptually, the risk based 
system has been stymied since it has become the regulator who decides what the risk is, 
rather than allowing firms to carry out their own risk function, with regulators checking that 
the risk process works and the firm developing its risk assessment skills. This initiative needs 
become less dirigiste to succeed. 
In assessing how deterrence should work, many regulators have latched on to a principle of 
three lines of defence. This follows the old military principle of castle building, the outer wall 
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representing the first line of defence, the inner wall the second line of defence, and the keep 
the final line. Fine for castle building in mediaeval Europe, but the only organisation building 
castles these days is Walt Disney. This concept of defence as applied to financial institutions 
has the customer facing staff as the front line, compliance as the second line and audit in the 
castle keep. This concept is outmoded, ineffective and encourages the wrong mentality in 
crime fighting. Better a system of integrated active defence, where all anti money laundering 
assets are designed to work together, as currently used by the world’s militaries to great 
effect in defences such as Integrated Air Defence Systems and Integrated Carrier Battle 
Groups. 
Capability 
Training of law enforcement in how financial markets work is generally below what it could 
be. Virtually all law enforcement officers are given some financial investigation training, but 
this is not the same as instruction in the operation of financial markets such that law 
enforcement has a chance of recognising egregious behaviour, apprehending the 
perpetrators and obtaining necessary evidence. Some kind of specialist financial police is 
needed, properly trained and supported, in all countries. Commitments currently range from 
Financial Investigation Units consisting of just one law enforcement officer, to specialist 
financial police like the Guardia di Finanza with a force of around 70,000 persons. 
Fines levied on banks are in the billions, yet at the same time governments appear unwilling 
to fund even small law enforcement projects. One member state agency, for example, 
promised funding for its creaking IT system to cope with suspicious activity reports, requiring 
just over €5 million, has finally been promised the funding, but not until 2023. 
AML compliance has become an end in itself, highly bureaucratic, with the real objectives 
having become lost in a mass of organisational data kleptomania. Digitisation of business has 
given rise to a search for an automated AML nirvana, reducing human input to a bare 
minimum. Yet money laundering deterrence is a human issue and programming errors can 
increase costs dramatically, as battles to reduce false positives have shown.  
Compliance is also often seen as all cost with little or no benefit. CEOs appear to prefer 
running the risk of massive fines than investing sufficiently in ensuring that their business 
models and compliance functions are properly aligned, effective and efficient. Far from 
scandals having changed such attitudes, they have been perpetuated, as the recent response 
by Scandinavian banks demonstrates. 
The Way Forward 
So where does the solution lie? The following steps and options are recommended for 
consideration: 
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Governance: 
• Develop clarity of vision and mission. Processes need to have an impact on the 
underlying threats, or there is no point introducing them;  
• Assess whether a new AML body is needed within Europe at policy co-ordination level. 
This could be separate, or be the policy arm of Europol, for example;  
• Ensure co-ordination works between EU member states, EEA member states, and non-
EU/EEA states, at all levels, and with similar bodies in related areas, such as ENISA; 
• Improve cross border co-operation, at all levels, including data collection, intelligence 
generation, policy making, investigation, information exchange, prosecution, etc. 
Risk Management: 
• Adopt key performance indicators (KPIs) which relate to the underlying criminal 
threats which AML laws are intended to impact. These need to be thought through, 
rather than being measures which are adopted purely as they are a measure and/or 
are easy to measure (such as the number of suspicious activity reports filed with law 
enforcement). The right metrics are needed to combat the threat. Data collection 
techniques in this area are also in need of improvement; 
• Allow firms to develop and use risk based systems to improve effectiveness; 
• Carry out effective Benefit Cost Analysis (rather than Cost Benefit Analysis) of 
proposed new measures; 
• Adopt active, co-ordinated defences, rather than the static three lines of defence 
model with all its attendant difficulties referred to above. 
Capability: 
• Encourage training and spending on specialised financial police; 
• Increase funding and support of law enforcement, particularly of undercover 
operations and IT systems, enabling law enforcement to follow the money trail from 
commission of crimes; 
• Improve training standards to a new EU level, including the courts process, policy 
makers, investigators and intelligence analysts. 
So what are the options for Europe? In essence they are to carry on as now (‘EU AML 1.0’), 
with little success. Alternatively, Europe can counter money laundering with renewed vigour, 
centralising that which needs to be centralised, integrating all AML defence systems, and 
ensuring that this ‘EU AML 2.0’ works in each of the various member states, particularly given 
the differences in threat, vulnerability and risk of those member states. 
Looking at the figures on drug deaths, terrorism, fraud, cybercrime, organised crime, etc., in 
each of the member states, and the negative impact this has on the whole of the EU, things 
could be different. Money laundering, like climate change and the threats to the natural 
world, is a truly European issue and needs a truly European response. We must not be found 
wanting. 
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